The most challenging, and often most rewarding, aspect of studying history is uncovering the truth about historical events that is often concealed layers of bias and partiality. It is therefore important to examine historical works with a cautious eye in order to achieve the historical accuracy. In his book Russia and the Origins of the First World War, D.C.B Lieven examines internal geopolitical issues that helped shape Russian foreign policy leading up to 1914. Lieven provides a succinct overview of perceived weaknesses, political and public opinions, pressure groups, economic circumstances, and leadership of Russia before the Great War. However, his relative exoneration of Russia during the July Crisis must be examined carefully. Lieven argues that Russia did not know about the assassination plot and that Russian military mobilization was a direct result of Germany’s aggressive and unconditional support of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. Historians like James Joll and David Stevenson provide an alternative view to Lieven’s assertion that Germany was the aggressor in the July Crisis and that Russia had no option but to mobilize. Furthermore, Luigi Albertini provides an alternate view to Lieven’s suggestion that Russia was not aware of the assassination plot against Franz Ferdinand. It is very difficult to assert which historian is correct in his claims, but it is important to examine various sources in order to assure the greatest degree of accuracy.  

Firstly, it is important to examine Lieven’s overview of Russia’s domestic issues before 1914. He clearly identifies Russia’s inefficient military spending in the years before the war. Although Russian economy grew at a rapid pace, Lieven asserts that unbalanced spending between military and education resulted in general backwardness of Russian economy.[1] He furthermore provides a credible account of Russian working class population susceptibility to socialist doctrines, suggesting their militancy grew before 1914 as exemplified by the fact that Russia had 5.4 times more strikes in 1914 than France.[2] Furthermore, Lieven suggests that Russia was ruled by the traditional elite, most of whom received their education at institutions such as Imperial Alexander Lycee which teaches patriotism, duty, and sense of Russian past glory.[3] All these aspects explain Russia’s domestic circumstances leading up to the war. It is difficult to argue about Lieven’s examinations of Russia’s internal issues. He provides a clear and accurate picture of how these factors contributed to Russian foreign policy. However, there are two major issues with Lieven’s assertions about Russia’s ruling elite that must be examined carefully.

First, Lieven explains the various viewpoints held by the ruling elite but he does not explain to what extent they had any impact on Russian policy. For example, Lieven suggests that P.N. Durnovo predicted that a war would make revolution more likely in Russia because it would result in disaster on the battlefield and a major supply crisis in Russia.[4] Likewise, G.N Trubetskoy, a member of Foreign Ministry believed that the glorious role played by Russia’s army liberating the Balkans could restore Russians’ pride in the past. He argued that Russia must help their Slave people from Germanic pressure.[5] However, Lieven never shows if these views, or any other, had any impact in shaping Russian foreign policy. If these individuals did not have much sway in shaping foreign policy, was Nicholas II as the autocrat solely responsible for determining such policy? Although Lieven examines mostly Russian documents to gather information for this book, he does not provide any documents to illuminate the level involvement in the government by various individuals he cites.

The second major issue is Lieven’s clear sympathy towards Nicholas II, claiming that he was neither “as weak nor as foolish as most Western commentators have imagined.”[6] However, Mark Ferraro in his book Nicholas II shows Nicholas’ lack of understanding of the seriousness of the July Crisis. Ferarro states that Nicholas did not understand how assassination in Sarajevo could lead Russia into a war; he believed that it was just another Balkan Crisis.[7] Furthermore, Samuel Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk provide Nicholas’ diary on July 25, 1914 where he briefly mentions the ultimatum issues to Serbia then devotes much of the entry to talk about his other activities throughout the day.[8] Lieven, in his book on Nicholas II states that these diaries show that he was a “gentleman of leisure” and a man "indifferent to events.”[9] However, it can be argued that Nicholas was a man who clearly did not understand the severity of the July Crisis whose indifference to events could be understood as a lack of knowledge of international affairs.

However, the major issue in Lieven’s account on the origins of the war is his exoneration of Russia during the July Crisis. In fact, he argues that “responsibility for the outbreak of the war rested unequivocally on the German government.”[10] This would certainly be true it was generally accepted that Germany’s support for Austria against Serbia was issued in order to purposefully bring Russian into the war. Although this is a plausible theory, it is not necessarily accepted by all historians. James Joll argues that Germany and Austria believed “that the more decisive Austrian action was and the firmer Germany’s backing of her ally, the less likely the Russians would be to intervene.”[11] Likewise, David Stevenson suggests that Wilhelm II was determined for a local war with Serbia and told Austria- Hungary that Germany would support them if Russia intervened because he believed that Russia was unprepared for war and would therefore think twice about intervening.[12] The major shortcoming of Lieven’s work on this issue is his lack of German or Austro-Hungarian primary documents to indicate their position on this topic. Without many accounts of German views, it is very difficult to argue, as Lieven does, that Germany was solely responsible for the outbreak of the war by forcing Russia to mobilize, especially given the fact that Russian mobilization itself was essential in the escalation of the crisis.

Therefore, it is important to examine Russian mobilization when outlining the causes of the war. Lieven suggests that Russian mobilization did not escalate the conflict because by then Germany and Austria-Hungary could not retreat without damaging their prestige.[13] However Samuel Williamson Jr., who seems impartial in his distribution of guilt, argues that Russian preparations for war like “no other actions in the crisis, beyond Vienna’s resolute determination for war, were so provocative or disturbing…”[14] Furthermore, he argues that Russia’s unwavering support of Serbia and its military measures escalated the crisis, while “general mobilization on 30 July guaranteed disaster.”[15] It would be irresponsible to suggest that Russian mobilization did not escalate the tension, ultimately leading to war. Russian mobilization was essential in the escalation of the tensions just like Germany’s unwavering support for Austria-Hungary was. This debate personifies the difficulty of distributing blame when it concerns the First World War. It is very difficult to highlight one issue, as Lieven does with German support for Austria-Hungary, as the main reason for the war because there were so many factors leading up to the crisis.

Another issue in the theme of Russian exoneration before the war is the fact that Lieven dismisses the claim that Russia knew of the assassination attempt against Franz Ferdinand. Lieven dismisses Luigi Albertini’s claim in his book that Russian military attaché in Serbia knew of the plot to assassinate Franz Ferdinand due to “ubcorroborated statements of suspect witnesses.”[16] Albertini claims that Russian Coloniel Artamonov knew of Apis’ plans about the assassination and suggested that Apis would not be alone. However, Albertini suggests that Artamonov could not make such a statement alone and therefore he went to his superior N.V Hartwig, a minister in Belgrade. According to Albertini, Apis claimed that Hartwig knew everything.[17] To argue the credibility of Albertini’s witness would be trivial, although it is important to note that one of the witnesses was Bozin Simic, a Colonel in the army and a member of the Black Hand. It would be more fruitful to examine Hartwig’s personality and political beliefs. Lieven claims that Russia’s leading diplomats warned of Hartwig’s “incurable Austrophobia and of his disloyalty to overall Russian foreign policy.”[18] It is important to note that Lieven does not defend Hartwig’s political beliefs when he dismisses Albertini’s claim.

Furthermore, in the previous chapters, Lieven expresses negative favorability towards Hartwig’s political skills suggesting that his “…interpretation of the Balkan crisis was entirely one-sides and the Russian Minister seems to have been blind to the risks entailed in the policies he supported…”[19] Therefore, it is not completely impossible to assume that Hartwig may have know about the plans to assassinate Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Simply by investigating his political beliefs, especially about policies in the Balkans, it seems that Hartwig would not have opposed the assassination plans. Although Albertini’s witnesses suggest that Hartwig knew of the plot while Soviet documents argue to the contrary, it is impossible to know for a fact if Hartwig knew about the assassination. However, for the purpose of historiography, it is important to note that Lieven does not provide any evidence to suggest that Hartwig did not know about the assassination plot.

Although there are some perceived shortcomings to Lieven’s arguments, Lieven provides a persuasive account of key events that shaped Russian foreign policy. Russia’s economic woes, unstable public opinion, and unrealistic leaders may perhaps indicate why Russia was ultimately unsuccessful in the war, but it does not indicate the origins of the First World War as Lieven attempts to convey.. For that, it is important to understand the key factors that contributed to the development of Russian foreign policy. He cites the Bosnia-Herzegovina annexation crisis of 1908-1909 throughout his book as the main factor that contributed to the development of Russian policy. Austria-Hungary aggressively pushed for the annexation of Bosnia while Russia could not protect its ally because it was still not strong enough military after the 1905 disaster. Therefore Russia had to accept political humiliation rather than military defeat. Russian leaders were embarrassed as exemplified by General Kireyev’s statement, claiming “Shame! Shame! It would be better to die.”[20] The annexation crisis and the political fallout afterwards is an important aspect when examining the origins of the war. First, Russia was convinced that it had to strengthen its alliances with France and Britain because this was the only way to exercise more influence against the Central Powers. Secondly, the humiliation after the annexation crisis convinced Russian leadership that they must protect their Slav brothers in the Balkans at all costs. Therefore when Austria threatened the invasion of Serbia, Russia was determined not to be humiliated the second time.[21]

In conclusion, D.C.B Lieven’s account on the origins of the First World War personifies the importance cautious historical examination. Although the book provides a broad and a generally accurate overview of Russia’s internal structures before the war, it is not without controversy. His distribution of blame for the war can be challenged when examining works of James Joll and David Stevenson. Furthermore, Lieven’s account of Russian knowledge of the assassination attempt can be doubted when compared to the works of Luigi Albertini. In this instance, it would not be correct to suggest that one author’s version of the events is more believable that the others. Their arguments were developed by the information that they gathered on the topic. Therefore, it is important for the readers to gather their own information in order to develop an argument that they believe is most correct. Lieven must be credited for writing a concise account of Russian internal mechanism leading up to the war. However, it is clear that this work was intended for a general, or perhaps an undergraduate reader who is sympathetic to Russian views. Those studying diplomacy would be disappointed with Lieven’s diminutive divulgence of foreign affairs, while students of Russian history can find more detailed writings about economic, military, and political accounts of Russia in the twentieth century.